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Abstract. Based on the formal-ontological paradigm of Constructive Descrip-
tions and Situations, we propose a definition of social collectives that includes
social agents, plans, norms, and the conceptual relations between them. We also
propose a typology of social collectives, including collection of agents, knowl-
edge community, intentional collective, and intentional normative collective. Our
ontology, represented as a first-order theory, provides the expressivity to talk
about the contexts (social, informational, circumstantial, and epistemic), in which
collectives make and produce sense.
Keywords. Formal Ontology, Constructivism, Social Entities, Semantic Web
1 Introduction
In this article we lay down the basis for an integrated ontology of the mutual de-
pendencies between agents, collectives, concepts, information, plans, and norms.
The ontology has a constructive approach, and is represented as a first-order
theory, as well as an OWL(DL) ([1]) ontology, for applications in the seman-
tic web1,and semantic web services domains (cf. [2]).
In previous work [3], we have treated some problems of collective intentionality
by introducing a formal-ontological definition of the notion of intentional collec-
tive. Our approach pivoted on two general ideas. On the one hand, we investigated
and formalized the grounds based on which we define a set of items as a collec-
tion, and collected items as members of a collection2. On the other hand, we pro-
posed a way of relating collections and their members to intentional and agentive
notions3. According to our reconstruction, collections can be seen as social ob-
jects (as defined in [20]) that (generically) depend on their members at a certain
time. This entails, for instance, that a collection of books in a library remains the
same entity even if some books are lost and others acquired over time. Collections
depend also (specifically) on the role(s) played by their members. Consider, for
example, the constellation of Orion. Should the role ‘being a member of Orion’
1 See e.g. the EU NeOn project site: http://www.neon-project.org
2 There is a large and heterogeneous literature on collections and plural entities; in our work, we
considered in particular [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]
3 On this topic, we made reference to classical works such as [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]
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cease to exist, the relative constellation would disappear too. Collections can also
be (and usually are) characterized by further roles; consider, for instance, the
collection of different (cutting, pasting, etc.) machines in a factory. Collections,
finally, are unified by ‘theory-like’ entities that we call descriptions, which con-
tain and specify the covering or characterizing roles of the collection.
Following this notion of collection, collectives in our proposal are collections of
agents which are unified by the kind of descriptions that we call plans. The mem-
bers of a collective are ‘held together’ by one plan, which specifies a goal and
(one or more) covering or characterizing role(s). In order for a collective to be
intentional, there must be a plan, and the agentive members of a collection must
play the covering or characterizing roles of that plan. For instance, in our view,
both a group of people running towards a common shelter because of a sudden
storm [21], and a pack of hunting wolves are to be considered as examples of
intentional collectives.
In this article, the proposal presented in [3] is updated and enriched under two
respects. Firstly, the very foundations of the original proposal are profoundly re-
structured by a new paradigm, called Constructive Descriptions and Situations.
Secondly, our definition of intentional collectives is exteded with normative el-
ements, as well as with the conceptual relations between such new normative
elements and the orginal planning elements. This move provides us with the con-
ceptual means to define collective entities like collection of agents, knowledge
community, intentional collective, and intentional normative collective. Within
this framework, an issue we address is how to represent in our formal ontological
framework the influence that norms may have on plans. We are not concerned
here with providing a full-fledged theory of these interactions. We rather want
to set a formal-ontological basis for modeling such theories. In other words, we
are aware of the fact that relevant work on norms, and possibly on their interac-
tions with plans, may be found both in the legal-philosophical literature (e.g. [22],
[23]), in the sociological literature (e.g. []), as well as in the multi-agent systems
literature (e.g. [24]). Here though we introduce a minimal setup of formal distinc-
tions between the types of interactions that norms may have with plans. Future
work will refine such distictions, possibly modelling existing proposals on that
basis.
Section 2 provides a brief informal overview on our previous work, including
Constructive Descriptions and Situations, and the ontologies of Plans, Norms,
and Collectives. Section 3 presents a formalization of our proposal. Finally, sec-
tion 4 draws some conclusions.
2 Constructive DnS and its extensions at a glance
In this section we informally introduce the ontological apparatus, on which our
treatment of collectives is based.We start with a brief presentation of Descriptions
and Situations (DnS), an ontology developed in [25], [26], [3]. We then present
Constructive DnS, a restructured version of DnS proposed in [27] and in this
paper. Finally, we provide a schematic introduction to our ontologies of Plans,
Norms and Collectives.
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2.1 Relations to previous work
In [3], we have provided a formal-ontological definition of the notion of inten-
tional collective. Our approach there pivoted on two general ideas: on the one
hand, we investigated and formalized the grounds based on which we define a
set of items as a collection and collected items as members of a collection; on
the other hand, we proposed a way of relating collections and their members to
intentional notions. The work presented in [3] was based on three ontologies: the
Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE) [28],
the ontology of Descriptions and Situations (DnS) [25] and the ontology of Plans
defined in [26].
In this article, the work described above is updated and enriched under two re-
spects. Firstly, the very foundations of our original proposal are profoundly re-
structured. The definition of collectives given here is not based anymore on a
combination of DOLCE and DnS, but on a brand-new version of DnS, called
Constructive DnS (hereafter, c.DnS). Secondly, our definition of intentional col-
lectives is exteded with normative elements. This provides us with the conceptual
means to define typologies of normed intentional collectives.
In its original version, DnS is a formal tool that allows to extend other (possibly,
but not exclusively, foundational) ontologies with a number of reified concepts
and relations, thus making the extended ontology more expressive without mak-
ing it computationally more complex. Suppose, for instance, that you want to use
DnS to extend DOLCE4. The final result of this extension would be DOLCE+.
DOLCE+ would consist, on the one hand, of DOLCE – which would play the
role of ground ontology, i.e. the ontology that specifies the entities of a given do-
main irrespective of any possible epistemological status or concern. On the other
hand, DOLCE+ would also consist of the DnS extension, that provides the formal
means to specify the epistemological perspective from which the entities of the
domain are considered. By way of example, suppose that such perspective is of
legal nature. The DnS extension makes it possible to express the legal constraints
imposed by norms and regulations on the domain of the ground ontology, i.e. to
describe the entities of DOLCE (in particular, entities pertaining to social reality)
under a legal perspective. In other words, in DOLCE+ it would become possible
to describe a legal view on the behaviour of DOLCE’s (social) entities according
to a given legal system.
Two are the key-elements of DnS:
The distinction between descriptions and situations which allows to separate,
within the same model of the legal domain, relations between ‘conceptual
elements’ like laws, norms, regulations, crime types, etc. (which are all de-
scriptions) from relations between ‘observable elements’ like legal facts,
cases, states of affairs, etc. (which are all situations).
A reification mechanism which allows to have descriptions and situations in the
same domain of quantification (i.e. at the same logical level) and to relate
them by means of a reified relation of satisfaction. For instance, according
to a DnS-based legal extension of a ground ontology like DOLCE, a case (a
situation) satisfies a norm (a description). This means that the norm (i.e. the
description and the concepts devised in it) classifies the entities of DOLCE,
4 The OWL-DL version of DnS combined with DOLCE can be loaded from http://www.loa-
cnr.it/ontologies/ExtendedDnS.owl.
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the ground ontology. This very classification gives rise to the case (i.e. the sit-
uation), which is a setting for the entities of the ground ontology that satisfy
(i.e. are individually classified by) the concepts devised in the description.
Both the case and the norm are part of the same domain of quatification. In
other words, the DnS extension makes it possible to enhance the expressivity
of the language of the ground ontology while keeping its complexity under
control – the usual advantage of reification.
While DOLCE+ is being effectively used in several projects, specially in its ver-
sion encoded in the Web Ontology Language (OWL), we have realized that the
expressive power of the reification vocabulary in DnS can be axiomatized and
reused beyond the scope of a specific foundational ontology (DOLCE or any
other). Based on this working hypothesis, we have created a new ontology that
applies the constructivist paradigm, and remains agnostic with respect to which
foundational, core, or domain ontology should be used as a primary modelling
framework for a knowledge base. We have named this ontology Constructive De-
scriptions and Situations (c.DnS).
2.2 The constructive stance
Constructivism is the epistemological stance according to which reality and its
structure are not given ‘as such’ for our minds to passively discover, but are rather
actively constructed by cognitive agents in specific contexts and for specific pur-
poses. This implies a rejection of naive interpretations of Aristotelian notion of
‘truth as correspondence’ (between constructs and chunks of ‘reality’), and a deep
awareness of the historical and social nature of all kinds of knowledge. It does
not imply, however, that we have to reject the idea that there are (physical, bi-
ological and cultural) constraints on the way the mind builds and manages its
constructs, nor that the whole scientific enterprise is devoid of meaning. Rather,
constructivism promotes a view according to which every scientific theory or
model should be seen as a ‘tool’, which is the product of a specific ‘knowledge
collective’5 and whose adequacy in representing and handling specific aspects of
our interaction with the world has to be tested against actual usage and effective-
ness, and always be open to revision (cf. [30]).
In cognitive sciences, in particular, this has led to see our mental representa-
tions as context-dependent (or ‘situated’) and action-oriented views on the world,
relating only to those aspects of the environment which are salient for the per-
ceiver/cognizer [31]. Moreover, focusing on the non-abstract nature of cognition
has lead to put a new emphasis on the ‘gestaltic’ aspects of representations, i.e.
the need of taking into account “the interconnected whole that gives meaning to
the parts” [32].
In current ontology research and engineering, however, epistemology is usually
left out of the picture. Viewpoints on, and theories of, the represented entities
are assumed not to play any relevant role inside an ontology, since the latter re-
flects a static, ‘frozen’, and widely shared portion of knowledge in a given field.
So, although even a common-sense concept, like sun, refers to an aspect of re-
ality that is ‘seen’ and understood in the terms set by a culturally determined
conceptualization, there seems to be little or no point in introducing this whole
5 The term is borrowed from Ludwik Fleck’s epistemological observations on ‘thought-
collectives’ (Denkkollektiv) and ‘thought-styles’ (Denkstil); cf. [29].
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conceptualization explicitly in, e.g., an ontology of weather conditions.
The intuition underlying this practice, however, comes to odds when an ontology
needs to be extended with social entities, such as social institutions, organizations,
plans, regulations, narratives, schedules, parameters, diagnoses, etc. Important
fields of investigation have denied an ontological primitiveness to social objects,
since the latters are taken to have meaning only in combination with some other
entity, i.e. it is assumed that their intended meaning results from a statement (see
e.g. [33]).
In that view, for example, a norm, a plan, or a social role should be better repre-
sented as a (set of) logical statement(s), not as logical individuals. This position is
documented by the almost exclusive attention dedicated by many relevant frame-
works (such as BDI agent model, theory of trust, situation calculus, and formal
context analysis) to states of affairs, facts, beliefs, and contexts, whose logical
representation is set at the level of theories or models, not at the level of concepts
or relations.
In c.DnS, we take seriously the attempt to build a constructive formal ontology
that assumes social entities as first-class citizens in a logical theory’s domain of
quantification.
2.3 Informal description of c.DnS
The core structure of c.DnS [27] is the following:
〈D,S,C,E,A,K, I, T 〉
where D is the class of Descriptions, S is the class of Situations, C is the class
of Concepts, E is the class of Entities, A is the class of (social) Agents,K is the
class of Collections, I is the class of Information Objects, and T is the class of
Time intervals.
In intuitive terms, these classes allow to model how a social agent, as a member
of a certain community, singles out a situation at a certain time, by using a de-
scriptive relation that assigns concepts to entities within that situation. In other
words, these classes are meant to formalize the constructivist assumption accord-
ing to which, in order to contextualize a concept, we need to take into account the
viewpoint/s or description/s inside which the concept is defined or used, the situ-
ation/s this viewpoint ‘carves out’ the perceived environment, the entities which
are in the setting of said situation/s, the social agents who share the viewpoint,
the collective, or community, of which these agents are members, the information
object/s by which the viewpoint is expressed, and, finally, the time or time-span
characterizing the viewpoint.
c.DnS’ classes are substrucured as follows: E is the class of everything that is
assumed to exist in some domain of interest, for any possible world. E is parti-
tioned in the class of ‘schematic entities’, i.e. entities which are axiomatized in
c.DnS (D, S, C, A, K, I), and the class of ‘non-schematic entities’, which are
not characterized in c.DnS (T ). Other non-primitive social enties may be added
as subtypes of E, depending on the needs of the modeled domain. For instance
in the application of c.DnS presented throughout section 3 the following addi-
tional entities are also considered: physical agents (PA) , internal representa-
tions (R), physical realizations (PR), objects (Object), actions (Action), and
regions (Region).
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The main purpose of c.DnS is to redescribe entities that are (or are assumed to
be) existing. For example, an existing situation including humans, cars, roads and
signs can be redescribed as a driving situation, as a racing situation, as well as a
speed-limit-violation situation, depending on the circumstances and on the inten-
tion of the interpreter of that situation.
In the field of developmental psychology, this ability has been described in terms
of Representational Redescription, “a process by which (implicit) information
that is in a cognitive system becomes progressively explicit to that system” [34],
allowing for greater flexibility.
This ‘redescription game’ is played in terms of a number of projections of the
general c.DnS relation, which allows to relate schematic and/or non-schematic
entities to one another. We provide here a brief overview of such projections per
class.
Descriptions are entities which represents a conceptualization, it is generically
dependent on some (physical) agent and communicable ([20]). Examples
of descriptions are regulations, plans, laws, diagnoses, projects, plots, tech-
niques, etc. Descriptions have typical components, called concepts, and are
related to other entities in c.DnS by means of the following projections:
defines, uses (which hold between descriptions and concepts); involves,
individuallyConstructedAs (compositions of relations holding between de-
scriptions and entities); unifies (holding between a descriptions and a col-
lections).
Situations are entities which represents a state of affairs, under the assumption
that its components ‘carve up’ a view (a setting) on the domain of an on-
tology by virtue of a description. Examples of situations (corresponding to
the examples of descriptions above) are: facts, plan executions, legal cases,
diagnostic cases, attempted projects, performances, technical actions, etc.
Situations are related to other entities in c.DnS by means of the follow-
ing projections: satisfies (holding between situations and descriptions);
hasInScope (holding between situations); settingFor (holding between
situations and entities).
Concepts are defined by a description and can be used in other descriptions.
Concepts are related to other entities in c.DnS by means of the following
projections: classifies (holding between concepts and entities); covers,
characterizes (holding between concepts and collections).
Entities are anything that is assumed to exist in some domain of interest, for
any possible world. Main subtypes of entities are ‘schematic’ and ‘non-
schematic’. Both subtypes may have a memberOf relation with collec-
tions, while non-schematic entities are related to other entities in c.DnS
by means of the following projections: constructs (holding between non-
schematic entities); actsFor (holding between non-schematic entities and
agents; realizes (holding between non-schematic entities and information
objects).
Social agents may be a person or an organization, but never a bio-physical sys-
tem that plays an agentive role6. Social agents are related to other entities
in c.DnS by means of the following projections: shares (holding between
social agents and descriptions); redescribes (holding between social agents
and situations); deputes (holding between social agents and concepts).
6 Agents of the latter kind are introduced as non-schematic entities.
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Collections are a naturalization in space-time of non-empty proper classes with
(at least one) basic properties for membership. This seems to capture the
common sense intuition underlying groups, teams, collections, collectives,
associations, etc.. For an extensive treatment of similarities and dissimilari-
ties between this notion of collection and the notions of (natutalized) set or
class refer to [3].
Information Objects are units of information which are related to other enti-
ties in c.DnS by means of the following projections: expresses (between
information objects and descriptions) and about (between information ob-
jects and entities). Collection are inversely related to other entities in c.DnS
by means of the following projections: unifies (holding between a descrip-
tions and a collections); covers, characterizes (holding between concepts
and collections);memberOf (holding between entities and collections).
Time intervals, which are not characterized in DnS (i.e. they are non-schematic
entities), are used for tagging descriptions, situations and projections. Time
intervals should be added to the ontologies, that do not include them in their
domain, when aligned to Constructive DnS.
Description Situation Concept Entity Social Collection Information
c.DnS agent object
(D) (S) (C) (E) (A) (K) (I)
Description na -satifies defines [1a], involves [1c], na unifies [1h] -expresses
(D) uses [1a] individuallyConstructedAs [2b]
Situation satifies [1b] hasInScope [1f] na settingFor [1d] na na na
(S)
Concept -defines, na na classifies [1c] na covers [1h], na
(C) -uses characterizes [1h]
Entity -individuallyConstructedAs -settingFor -classifies constructs [2b], acts for [2a] memberOf [1h] realizes [2c],
(E) -involves -about
Social agent shares [1e] redescribes [1f] deputes [1e] -acts for na na
(A)
Collection -unifies na -covers, -memberOf na na na
-characterizes
(K)
Infomation object expresses [1g] na na about [1g] na na na
(I) -realizes
Table 1: c.DnS’s classes, projections and principles, inverse projections
All projections mentioned above are based on two main constructive principles:
the social construction principle and the grounded construction principle. On their
turn, these principles are based on a larger set of other principles, listed below.
Moreover, Table 1 shows the classes of c.DnS and their projections with a refer-
ence to the corresponding principles.
1. The social construction principle is based on:
(a) Relationality principle: concepts are always defined in a relational con-
text (i.e. a description or a gestalt).
(b) Interpretability principle: situations are always emerging/interpreted in
a relational context according to some expected configuration.
(c) Classification principle: entities are always internally represented with
reference to a concept.
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(d) Situatedness principle: entities are always internally represented within
a context according to some expected or reconstructed configuration.
(e) Sharing principle: descriptions are always dependent on social agents.
(f) Epistemological layering principle: given a description d1 that involves
another description d2 , a situation s1 that satisfies d1 has in its scope a
situation s2 that satisfies d2.
(g) Formedness principle: descriptions are always expressed by information
objects that provide a form to them.
(h) Containment principle: there exists a collection for all entities classified
by a concept.
(i) Interaction principle: any social agent must be member of a knowledge
collective in order to share a description.
2. The grounded construction principle is based on:
(a) Agent efficacy principle: social agents should always be acted by some
entity.
(b) Cognitive counterpart principle: for any description there is a social
agent who shares it and who is acted by a physical agent that constructs
an internal representation which is the individual construction of that
description.
(c) Information grounding principle: any information object must have a
physical support.
2.4 Plans, Norms and Collectives
Based on c.DnS, we define the notions of Plan, Norm and Collective and exploit
their relations for defining typologies of normed collective entities.
For what concerns the notion of plan, we stick here to [26] where a plan is a
description that represents an action schema that is shared by a social agent but
constructed by a physical agent. In addition, a plan defines or uses or has as
proper parts tasks, roles, goals, where:
Task is a concept that classifies actions (or similar non-schematic action-like
entities)
Role is a concept that classifies objects (or similar non-schematic object-like
entities)
Goal is the proper part of the plan that is desired by an agent
For what concerns the notion of norm, we take here the stance of [35] where a
norm is a description, i.e. norms are treated there in their social sense (which
includes but is not limited to the legal sense). This view on norms takes also
into account Searle’s distinction [21] between regulative and constitutive norms:
regulative norms provide codes of conduct (i.e. regulations), while constitutive
norms create social individuals and possibly contain no regulations at all. Here
we mainly concentrate on regulative norms, on their social usage and on their in-
fluence on agents’ plans and collectives. If the entities of a situation are classified
by the concepts (roles, tasks, parameters) used in the norm, then the situation falls
under the norm. This is an important difference from plans, which are executed in
novel situations: norms are satisfied in a more complex and indirect way, because
a situation that falls under a norm does not necessarily satisfy it.
Based on this simple model of norms, we address in this paper the issue of how to
represent in c.DnS the influence that norms may have on plans. We are not con-
cerned here with providing a full-fledged theory of this interactions. We rather
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want to set a formal-ontological basis for modeling such theories. In other words,
we are aware of the fact that relevant work on norms, and possibly on their inter-
actions with plans, may be found both in the legal-philosophical literature [22],
[23] and in the multi-agent systems literature [24]. Here though we base our anal-
ysis on an a set of intuitive distinctions between the types of interactions that
norms may have with plans. Future will refine such distictions, possibly based
on other existing proposals. So, for the moment, in c.DnS norms may be seen as
interacting with plans in one of three ways.
Norms as conventions that emerge from existing practices or plans. A norm, ei-
ther social or legal, usually reflects an existing practice within a community.
Typically, social and legal systems are the main way to maintain a stabil-
ity among the members and the resources of a community, population, or
country.
Norms as compliance checking protocols over social behavior or legal cases.
Once a norm lifecycle is established, norms can be enforced by using them
as filters for social behavior. Typically, the initiative for compliance checking
is limited to the interest of other parties with respect to the behavior of one
party.
Norms as constraints within plans. Once a norm lifecycle is established, and
appropriate enforcing and compliance checking practices emerge, they can
be used by social agents as constraints within their own plans. In this sense,
norms are akin to behavioral principles. If taken as principles for social be-
haviour, norms can be executed, similarly to plans, and in fact they are exe-
cuted as subplans.
Finally, c.DnS, together with the theories of plans and norms described above,
provide us with the formal means to define the notion of collective and a typology
for these:
Collection of agents is a collection unified by some rationale that is extrinsic
with respect to the knowledge shared by the member agents.
Knowledge community is a collection of agents unified by descriptions that are
shared by the member agents.
Intentional collective is a knowledge community that is unified by a plan shared
by member agents.
Intentional normative collective is a knowledge community that is unified by
a plan that, in turn, is entrenched with norms according to of the possible
interaction between norms and plans described above.
3 Formal apparatus
3.1 The c.DnS relation
The c.DnS relation is given in (1). Each element of the core structure is encoded
as a domain in a relation with arity=8:
c.DnS(d, s, c∗, e∗, a∗, k∗, i∗, t∗)→
D(d) ∧ S(s) ∧ C(c∗) ∧ E(e∗) ∧A(a∗) ∧K(k∗) ∧ I(i∗) ∧ T (t∗) (1)
D can be read as Description, S as Situation, C as Concept, E as Entity, A as
social Agent,K as Collection, I as Information object, and T as Time interval.
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Intuitively, the c.DnS relation says that a social agent, as a member of a given
knowledge community, singles out a situation at a certain time, by using a de-
scriptive relation that assigns concepts to entities within that situation.
The ‘*’ variables are ordered-list variables, i.e. they can occur more than one time
in an orderly way (ordered lists are paired, based on the projections described in
section 3.3). Without list variables, c.DnS relation would formalize only ‘atomic’
situations, based e.g. on only one concept, one entity, one time interval, etc.).
In real modelling (see 3.3), several occurrences of argument types are possible,
for example admitting different agent’s and situation’s times, and several entities
within a same situation, as when a detective singles out an event occurred days
before, for the sake of interpreting a killer’s modus operandi. Such a case is ex-
emplified in the statement 2, which contains four entities, four concepts, and two
time intervals.
c.DnS(KnowledgeOfPreviousCases#1,KillingSituation#1,
{Precedent,Killer, Tool,HypotheticalIntention},
{Event#1, PhysicalAgent#1, PhysicalTool#1, P lan#1},
Detective#1, InvestigationTeam#1, P reviousCaseReport#1,
{TimeOfEvent#1, T imeOfInterpretation#1}) (2)
In the following, list variables are not used, because c.DnS relation is best ex-
plained through its projections, which make it useful in most real world projects,
where computational languages do not allow (or make it too complex) represent-
ing list variables and >2-ary relations.
3.2 Characterization of classes
E is the class of everything that is assumed to exist in some domain of interest
for any possible world. (3):
2∀x(E(x)) (3)
D, S, C, A,K, I , and T are subclasses of E (1):
(D(x) ∨ S(x) ∨ C(x) ∨A(x) ∨K(x) ∨ I(x) ∨ T (x))→ E(x) (4)
D, S, C, A, K, and I are all mutually disjoint, and constitute the class SE of
schematic entities (5).
SE(x) =df D(x) ∨ S(x) ∨ C(x) ∨A(x) ∨K(x) ∨ I(x) (5)
All instances of E that are not instances of SE are non-schematic entities. SE
and non-schematic entities cover the class E.
E(e) ≡ SE(e) ∨ ¬SE(e) (6)
Since time intervals are not in SE, they are non-schematic entities. Time intervals
are important in c.DnS because we need to add a temporal indexing to some
constructivist relations. In practice, when using c.DnS jointly with an existing
ontology that does not reflect any commitment to time intervals, we need adding
time intervals to it.
T (t)→ ¬SE(t) (7)
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The main application of c.DnS is redescribing existing entities, independent of
such existence being derived from other (formal or informal) ontologies or as-
sumed. For example, an existing situation including humans, cars, roads and signs
can be redescribed as a driving situation, as a racing situation, as well as a speed-
limit-violation situation, depending on other circumstances and on the intention
of the interpreter of that situation. We define a redescription relation as a partial
projection of c.DnS as follows:
redescription(a, e, s, t)→ A(a) ∧ E(e) ∧ S(s) ∧ T (t) (8)
Axiom 8 states that redescription holds for agents and entities within a situation,
at some time. For example, the sentence the Italian road police has fined Manuel
Fangio for a speed-limit violation on Thursday, January 18th 2007 can be mod-
elled by using the redescription relation (9, 10).
redescription(ItalianRoadPolice,ManuelFangioDriving,
SpeedLimitV iolation18010732, ThursdayJanuary18th2007) (9)
redescription(ItalianRoadPolice,ManuelFangio,
SpeedLimitV iolation18010732, ThursdayJanuary18th2007) (10)
Each redescription concerns one of the entities that get redescribed in that situ-
ation. Statements 9 and 10 exemplify two such entities: Manuel Fangio, and his
driving.
Based on the redescription relation, we define a class of GroundEntities as
those entities that get redescribed:
G(e) =df E(e) ∧ ∃a, s, t(redescription(a, e, s, t)) (11)
Definition in 11 introduces ground entities as entities that are redescribed by an
agent that ‘frames’ them within a situation at some time.
For the sake of intuition, the generic relation of interpretation (12) between an
agent and an entity whatsoever at some time can be considered as a poorer pro-
jection of c.DnS:
interprets(a, e, t)→ A(a) ∧ E(e) ∧ T (t) (12)
In practice, the constructive assumption in our ontology makes interpretation of
entities by some agent at some time logically dependent on descriptions, situa-
tions, concepts, collectives, and information objects. How this assumption is un-
folded, both formally and intuitively, is the theme of the next subsections. In the
remainder of c.DnS presentation, we show how the c.DnS relation is projected
and axiomatized so that the redescription relation can be actually used in as
many domains as possible.
Additional entity types While a purely constructivist theory can live with-
out postulating types of entities (besides time intervals), some common-sense
type distinctions are of obvious practical advantage in the management of many
social domains. In particular, we will present both a purely constructivist and
a grounded (or ‘common-sense’) versions of the construction principle. In the
grounded version, we make use of some types of non-schematic entities: PA
(physical agents), R (internal representations), and PR (physical realizations).
In the plan ontology (see below), we also use the classes Object, Action, and
Region.
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3.3 Projections of c.DnS: the social construction principle
Several projections of the c.DnS relation can be defined by means of binary or
ternary relations, and axioms. Most projections we consider are irreflexive, asym-
metric, and intransitive. Besides the specific projection signature, their axiomati-
zation requires a temporalized properPartOf relation.
Here we list, mostly in an informal way, the projections that we deem necessary
in order to lay a foundation for c.DnS. Each projection implies the full c.DnS re-
lation according to the axiom schema in 13; these implication axioms should be
assumed, and are not included in the axiomatization.
[projection](x1...xn, xi ∈ {d, s, c, e, a, k, i, t})→
c.DnS(d, s, c, e, a, k, i, t) (13)
Each projection is introduced as a principle for the logical representation of the
construction of the social realm. The principles proposed will be finally composed
into a social construction principle. Altogether, they constitute an extended ac-
count of the social constraints acting when an agent’s ontological commitment is
formed. On the other hand, one or more principles could be dropped if considered
unnecessary or too strong for a particular ontology project (this implying that the
construction principle is lost).
For the complete axiomatization, and for technical details on how c.DnS is ap-
plied in domain ontology projects, we refer to the technical reports from our
ontology portal 7.
The following is the signature of the (basic) c.DnS projections:
〈specializes, defines, uses, satisfies, classifies, involves, settingFor,
shares, deputes, hasInScope, redescribes, expresses, about,
memberOf, covers, characterizes, unifies, gUnifies〉
The relationality principle The defines relation (14) is the projection of
c.DnS over descriptions and concepts (cf. [20]).
defines(d, c)→ D(d) ∧ C(c) (14)
Defines formalizes the intuition of a gestalt [36], or ‘context’ [32], that gives
meaning to the parts. Some examples iare modelled in 15, 16, 17.
defines(ItalianConstitution,Minister) (15)
defines(LinneanTaxonomy, Species) (16)
defines(CNRRegulation, SeniorResearcher) (17)
If we assume that a defines relation is required for concepts, i.e. that concepts
are always defined in a relational context - a description -, that assumption can
be called the relationality principle (18).
C(c)→ ∃d(D(d) ∧ defines(d, c) (18)
7 http://www.loa-cnr.it/ontologies/index.html
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The uses relation (axiom 19, exemplified in Statement 20) reflects the fact that,
besides defining concepts, descriptions can also use concepts defined by some
other description.
uses(d, c)→ D(d) ∧ C(c) ∧ ∃d′(d 6= d′ ∧ defines(d′, c)) (19)
uses(ChiefOfStateV isitEtiquette,MasterOfCeremonies) (20)
Descriptions can also introduce social agents, which are here entities such as
persons, organizations, institutional figures, etc. (see 21, with some examples in
22, 23, 24)).
introduces(d, a)→ D(d) ∧A(a) (21)
introduces(ItalianConstitution, ItalianGovernment) (22)
introduces(FIATLegalConstitution, FIAT_SpA) (23)
introduces(ItalianLawBirthDeclaration, PhysicalLegalPerson)(24)
Although introduction of agents falls under the relationality principle, like defi-
nition and usage, it has a different intuition from definition and usage, because
concepts and agents are disjoint classes, where the differences are:
– agents can share descriptions (see section 3.3)
– agents (specially organizations) typically depute concepts (see axiom 41)
– in the grounded version of the construction principle (see section 3.4), so-
cial agents are acted by (axiom 81) some physical agent (axiom 84) that is
classified by (axiom 29) some concept deputed by (axiom 41) a social agent
The interpretability principle The satisfies relation is the projection of
c.DnS over situations and descriptions.
satisfies(s, d)→ S(s) ∧D(d) (25)
It formalizes the intuition of an instantiation of a gestalt, i.e. the application of
gestalts to actually occurring contexts in the life of a cognitive agent. For exam-
ple:
satisfies(MandateForGovernmentToProdi,
LawForGovernmentFormation) (26)
If we assume that a satisfies relation is required for situations, i.e. that situa-
tions are always emerging/interpreted in a relational context according to some
expected configuration, that assumption can be called the interpretability prin-
ciple.
S(s)→ ∃d(D(d) ∧ satisfies(s, d)) (27)
Each description generates a situation class, which contains all the situations that
satisfy that description. For example,
satisfies(x,LawForGovernmentFormation)→
LegalGovernmentFormation(x) (28)
A situation class can be empty however, since there may be descriptions that are
never satisfied by any situation.
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The classification principle The classifies relation is the projection of
c.DnS over concepts and entities.
classifies(c, e, t)→ C(c) ∧ E(e) ∧ T (t) (29)
It formalizes the intuition of a redescription of an entity, i.e. the application of
a (new) gestaltic concept to something which is already provided with an avail-
able identity in actually occurring contexts in the life of a cognitive agent. For
example, the statement 30 has the consequence that the social agent Napolitano
is provided with the additional identity of ItalianPresidentRole for 2007:
classifies(ItalianPresidentRole,Napolitano, 2007) (30)
Note that ItalianPresident is a social agent, since it has the properties given in
section 3.3; anyway, that social agent also needs to depute (41) the concept Ital-
ianPresidentRole8that can classify different entities at different times, but only
one at a time, while other concepts admit to classify different entities at the same
time, e.g. the concept Senator (31). The different ways of classifying entities usu-
ally depend on the type of agent that deputes the concept, see section 3.4.
classifies(Senator,Napolitano, 2005) (31)
classifies(Senator, LeviMontalcini, 2005) (32)
If we assume that a classifies relation is required for ground entities to be con-
sidered in c.DnS, i.e. ground entities are always internally represented with refer-
ence to a concept, that assumption can be called the classification principle.
G(x)→ ∃c(C(c) ∧ classifies(c, x, t)) (33)
Compositional projections can be defined from primitive ones. The projection in-
volves is compositionally defined, and states that a description involves a ground
entity when the latter is classified by a concept defined or used by the description.
involves(d, e, t) =df D(d) ∧ E(e) ∧ T (t) ∧
∃c((defines(d, c) ∨ uses(d, c)) ∧ classifies(c, e, t)) (34)
The situatedness principle The settingFor relation is the projection of
c.DnS over situations and entities.
settingFor(s, e)→ S(s) ∧ E(e) (35)
It formalizes the intuition of contextualization of an entity, i.e. the application of
gestalts to actually occurring contexts in the life of a cognitive agent. For exam-
ple:
settingFor(MandateForGovernmentToProdi,Napolitano, 2007)(36)
If we assume that a settingFor relation is required for ground entities, i.e.
ground entities are always internally represented within a context according to
some expected or reconstructed configuration, such assumption can be called the
situatedness principle (37).
G(x)→ ∃s(S(s) ∧ settingFor(s, x)) (37)
8 Differently from the legal one, the common sense notion of Italian president is usually that of
a concept, not of a social agent
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The sharing principle The shares relation is the projection of c.DnS over
social agents and descriptions.
shares(a, d, t)→ A(a) ∧D(d) ∧ T (t) (38)
It formalizes the intuition of the social nature of a description, i.e. the mapping
of descriptions on social agents that are acted by one or more physical agents.
Note that by ‘social nature’ we do not mean that a description should actually
be shared by a community (although this is typically what happens), but that a
description must be communicable among social agents. For example:
shares(Napolitano, LawForGovernmentFormation, 2006) (39)
If we assume that a shares relation is required for descriptions, i.e. descriptions
are always dependent on social agents, that assumption can be called the sharing
principle.
Notice that social agents include both persons and organizations, but not physical
systems that can play agentive roles (these are introduced in the grounded version
of DnS, see section 3.4).
The sharing principle states that descriptions must be shared by at least one agent
(40).
D(x)→ ∃(a, t)(A(a) ∧ T (t) ∧ shares(a, x, t)) (40)
Besides sharing descriptions, social agents can depute (41) concepts (e.g. roles)
that are supposed to enact the agent’s actions (see section 3.4).
deputes(a, c, t)→ A(s) ∧ C(c) ∧ T (t) (41)
For example, a telecom company can depute the role ’engineer’ that can clas-
sify certain entities (typically, persons with appropriate curricula) to act for the
company. Back to our legal example:
deputes(ItalianState, ItalianPresident, 2006) (42)
The epistemological layering principle The hasInScope relation reflects
the intuition that situations can be epistemologically layered, when a description
d1 involves another description d2, and a situation s1 that satisfies d1 has another
situation s2 that satisfies d2 in its scope. (43).
hasInScope(s1, s2) =df S(s1) ∧ S(s2) ∧ s1 6= s2 ∧
∃(d1, d2, a, t)(D(d1) ∧D(d2) ∧A(a) ∧ T (t) ∧
d1 6= d2 ∧ satisfies(s1, d1) ∧ satisfies(s2, d2) ∧
involves(d1, d2, t) ∧ shares(a, d1, t) ∧ shares(a, d2, t)) (43)
An example is in 44.
hasInScope(MurderCase128, CaesarStabbedByBrutus) (44)
Epistemological layering is a principle in the c.DnS core, corresponding to the
figure-ground shifting cognitive schema from Gestalt psychology and, more re-
cently, cognitive linguistics [36], [37].
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The application of epistemological layering is fundamental in c.DnS, since it ac-
counts for the role of agents in the application of a description to some situation,
i.e., in order to include the ontological commitment within an ontology’s domain
of discourse. In practice, ontological commitment [38] postulates the action of
some agent that has the capability and the intention to (re)describe (=interpret) a
situation.
This is formalized by means of the relation redescribes (45), which is the pro-
jection of c.DnS over social agents and situations.
redescribes(a, s2, t) =df A(a) ∧ S(s2) ∧ T (t) ∧
∃s1(S(s1) ∧ s1 6= s2 ∧ shares(a, d1, t) ∧
satisfies(s1, d1) ∧ hasInScope(s1, s2)) (45)
An example of application of redescribes is in 46.
redescribes(SherlockHolmes,HoundOfBaskervilleFact, 1890) (46)
The formedness principle The expresses relation is the projection of c.DnS
over information objects and descriptions. It formalizes the intuition of the intrin-
sic communicability of every description (cf. [34]).
expresses(i, d, t)→ I(i) ∧D(d) ∧ T (t) (47)
For example:
expresses(ItalianConstitutionText, ItalianConstitution, 1946) (48)
We call formedness principle (49) the assumption that an expresses relation
is required for descriptions, i.e. descriptions are always expressed by information
objects that provide a form to them.
D(x)→ ∃(i, t)(I(i) ∧ (T (t) ∧ expresses(i, x, t)) (49)
Information objects appear in other projections of c.DnS, which can be defined
compositionally. For example, the aboutness of information objects can be de-
fined through composing the expresses, satisfies, and settingFor relations
(50).
about(i, e, t) =df I(i) ∧ E(e) ∧ T (t) ∧ ∃(d, s)(D(d) ∧ S(s) ∧
expresses(i, d, t) ∧ satisfies(s, d) ∧ settingFor(s, e)) (50)
Aboutness states that, if the description expressed by an information object is
satisfied by a situation, the information object can be about any entity that is in
the setting of said situation. For example, in 51, the Italian Constitution is (also)
about Italy.
about(ItalianConstitutionText, Italy, 2006) (51)
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The containment principle The entities that are classified by a same concept
or a same set of concepts, either defined by the same description or not, are easier
to compare, and can be put in a same collection (K). An appropriatememberOf
relation (52) holds for sets of said entities9
memberOf(e, k, t)→ E(e) ∧K(k) ∧ T (t) (52)
For example, in 54, D’Alema is a member of the Italian Government collective
in 2007. Italian Government collective is intended here as the collection of all
members from any particular Italian Government.
memberOf(D′Alema, ItalianGovernmentCollective, 2007) (53)
Note that ItalianGovernmentCollective is not the same entity as ItalianGovern-
ment, which is a social agent. The difference is not purely academic, because
Italian Government identity depends on the current Italian Constitution, and Ital-
ian Government collective is bound to it; but there are collectives of Italian gov-
ernments that have different identities based on the way they have been elected,
nominated, or behaved.
For example, from the legal viewpoint, Prodi2Collective has a different identity
from the general Italian Government collective, although the two collectives are
co-extensional (have the same members) for a limited time period (see example
??). Of course, also Prodi2 is a social agent, which specializes ItalianGovernment
(cf. 55).
memberOf(D′Alema, Prodi2Collective, 2007) (54)
specializes(Prodi2, ItalianGovernment) (55)
If we postulate a collection comprising all entities classified by a concept, for
each concept, the resulting axiom represents the containment principle (56).
C(c)→ ∀(e, t)((E(e) ∧ T (t) ∧ classifies(c, e, t))→
∃x(K(x) ∧memberOf(e, x, t)) (56)
The concept(s) that classify all the members of a collection are said to cover a
collection (57):
covers(c, k) =df C(c) ∧K(k) ∧
∀(e, t)((E(e) ∧memberOf(e, k, t))→ classifies(c, e, t)) (57)
Statement 58 is about the fact that the collective ItalianMinisterCouncil has all
members that are classified by the concept Minister.
covers(Minister, ItalianMinisterCouncil) (58)
Many collections can have subcollections covered by different concepts. In that
case, we say that those concepts characterize the collection (59). Since subcol-
lections can change without affecting the identity of a collection, characterizes is
temporalized.
characterizes(c, k, t) =df C(c) ∧K(k) ∧ T (t)
∃(k1)(covers(c, k1) ∧ properPartOf(k1, k, t)) (59)
9 Cf. [26] and [3] for a different axiomatization that also assumes DOLCE).
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Statement 60 is about the fact that (from a socio-political viewpoint), the collec-
tive ItalianMinisterCouncil has some members that are classified by the concept
Reformer.
characterizes(Reformer, ItalianMinisterCouncil, 2006) (60)
A complex concept, whose component concepts collectively characterize all mem-
bers of a collection, results to cover it (cf. 61).
∀(c, k)(C(c) ∧K(k) ∧ ∃(c1, c2, t)(c1 6= c2 ∧
characterizes(c1, k, t) ∧ characterizes(c2, k, t) ∧
properPartOf(c1, c, t) ∧ properPartOf(c2, c, t) ∧
¬∃(c3)(characterizes(c3, k, t) ∧ c1 6= c3 ∧ c2 6= c3))→
covers(c, k, t)) (61)
The descriptions that define the concept(s) or concept collections that cover a
collection are said to unify it (62).
unifies(d, k) =df D(d) ∧K(k) ∧
∃(c)(defines(d, c) ∧ covers(c, k)) (62)
Statement 63 is inferred from 62, 15, and 58: since unifies composes the rela-
tions defines and covers, the description ItalianConstitution defines the concept
Minister, andMinister covers the collection ItalianMinisterCouncil, then Italian-
Constitution unifies ItalianMinisterCouncil.
unifies(ItalianConstitution, ItalianMinisterCouncil) (63)
When unification is applied to the parts of an entity, so that the unifying descrip-
tion defines concepts that characterize the configuration aspects of that entity, the
collection is called configuration (Cfg, definition 64).
Cfg(k) =df K(k) ∧
∀(e, t)(memberOf(e, k, t)→
∃(e1, d, t)(properPartOf(e, e1, t) ∧
unifies(d, k) ∧ involves(d, e1, t)) (64)
For example, the collection of all parts of a car, when the unifying description is
its functional design, is a configuration.
In case a collection is covered or characterized by more than one concept defined
in different descriptions, so that all entities in the collection are classified by
characterizing concepts, then the collection results to be unified by a bundle of
descriptions, in which the characterizing concepts are defined (definition 65).
Bundle(d) =df D(d) ∧ ∃(d1, d2, t)(properPartOf(d1, d, t) ∧
properPartOf(d2, d, t) ∧ (∃(k, c1, c2)(defines(d1, c1) ∧
defines(d2, c2) ∧ characterizes(c1, k) ∧
characterizes(c2, k) ∧ unifies(d, k)) ∨
(∃(s)(satisfies(s, d1) ∧ satisfies(s, d2) ∧ satisfies(s, d))))) (65)
The notion of bundle of descriptions is defined in 65: a bundle is a (mereological)
sum of (at least two) descriptions that are either all satisfied by a situation, or all
define concepts that characterize a same collection.
Norms and plans as unification criteria for social collectives 19
The taxonomy principle The specializes relation (66) is the projection of
c.DnS between schematic entities (in [20] this relation is limited to concepts
only). It conveys the intuition of a taxonomic schema across schematic entities,
for example in 67, the social agent Prodi2 Government specializes Italian Gov-
ernment.
specializes(se1, se)→ SE(se1) ∧ SE(se) (66)
specializes(Prodi2Government, ItalianGovernment) (67)
The difference between specializes and the traditional subClassOf and instanceOf
relations is subtle. Firstly, specializes can be considered as a reification of sub-
ClassOf, since the latter holds for logical classes, while specializes holds for
schematic entities.10
Secondly, since we are using first-order logic with a model-theoretic semantics,
the subClassOf and instanceOf relations can also be used with schematic entities,
and the choice between specializes and instanceOf often results to be a matter of
good practice. For example, we may want to consider Government as a class in-
stead of a social agent, if there is no given description that introduces (cf. axiom
21) government as a social agent. On the contrary, ItalianGovernment is intro-
duced by the description ItalianConstitution, therefore it can be suitably modeled
as a social agent. As a consequence, Government is subClassOf A (Social Agent),
Prodi2Government specializes ItalianGovernment, and both Prodi2Government
and ItalianGovernment are instanceOf Government.
The interaction principle A constructivist ontology should be able to contex-
tualize agents’ knowledge within their communities, called thought collectives in
(cf. [39]). To this purpose, we introduce a classKC of knowledge communities,
as a collection whose members share at least one description (68).
KC(k) =df K(k) ∧ ∃(d)(D(d) ∧ ∀(a, t)(memberOf(a, k, t)→
shares(a, d, t))) (68)
A knowledge community is different from a simple agent collection, as in cases
like biological species, epidemiological groups, etc., since the members of a sim-
ple agent collection do not necessarily share any description, and it is even doubt-
ful if agents like members of a biological or clinical group could be considered
as agents at all, in the sense proposed here.
When the membership relation is considered necessary for descriptions to ex-
ist, the resulting axiom corresponds to the interaction principle (69): any social
agent must be member of a knowledge community in order to share a description.
shares(a, d, t)→ ∃kc(memberOf(a, kc, t) ∧KC(kc) ∧
unifies(d, kc) ∧ ∃d1(∀a1(memberOf(a1, kc, t)
→ shares(a1, d1, t))) (69)
10 In a similar vein, descriptions can be considered as reifications of intensional relations, con-
cepts as reifications of intensional classes, situations as reifications of extensional relations,
and collections as reifications of extensional classes.
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The statements in 70 through 75 exemplify how sharing is independent from as-
suming a description: FlogistonTheory was shared by both Stahl and Lavoisier,
but only Stahl assumed it; on the other hand, it is not sure that Stahl actually
shared OxygenTheory, because in the original debate there is no proof that he
understood it, therefore, we are only allowed to state that Lavoisier shared (and
assumed) it.
shares(Stahl, F logistonTheory) (70)
shares(Lavoisier, F logistonTheory) (71)
shares(Lavoisier,OxygenTheory) (72)
Assumes is here proposed (73) as a more specific way of sharing a description,
but without defining it. Defining assumption would require much more, e.g., we
should axiomatize the relation between assumptions of descriptions, and beliefs
about situations: while sharing a description is certainly required to an agent in
order to believe a situation that satisfies that description, it is not sufficient to
conclude that sharing is sufficient to that agent to actually believe it. The issue is
even subtler, because we cannot either conclude that assuming that description is
sufficient to believe that situation, since there can be additional constraints that
make a situation unbelievable. Conversely, there can be cases in which a situation
is believed without assuming the description it satisfies. We do not attempt an
axiomatization of these epistemological issues here.
assumes(a, d, t)→ shares(a, d, t) (73)
assumes(Stahl, F logistonTheory) (74)
assumes(Lavoisier,OxygenTheory) (75)
Although we stay neutral with reference to how assumptions and beliefs are in-
tertwined, we can use assumes as a primitive to introduce the notion of paradigm
(76), which is important for a constructive ontology and to characterize collec-
tives. Paradigms are defined here as bundle-based configurations of descriptions
that are assumed by the members of a knowledge community. Those knowledge
communities (common either in the commonsense or the scientific domains) re-
sult to be unified by paradigms.
Paradigm(p) =df Bundle(p) ∧ ∀(d, t)(properPartOf(d, p, t)→
D(d) ∧ ∃(kc)(KC(kc) ∧ ∀(a)(memberOf(a, kc, t)→
assumes(a, d, t)))) (76)
The social construction principle The unification relation holding for col-
lections can also be used for ground entities, and we generalize a temporal version
of it for all ground entities (gUnifies, or generalized unification, 80).
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A composition of c.DnS projections leads to the social construction prin-
ciple (77):
G(x)↔
∃(d, s, c, a, i, kc, t, c1, d1, s1, t1)(D(d) ∧ S(s) ∧ C(c) ∧A(a) ∧
I(i) ∧KC(kc) ∧ T (t) ∧ C(c1) ∧D(d1) ∧ S(s1) ∧
T (t1) ∧ classifies(c, x, t) ∧ settingFor(s, x) ∧ defines(d, c) ∧
satisfies(s, d) ∧ shares(a, d, t) ∧ unifies(d, kc) ∧
memberOf(a, kc, t) ∧ deputes(a, c1, t) ∧ expresses(i, d, t) ∧
settingFor(s, t) ∧ redescribes(a, s, t1) ∧ shares(a, d1, t1) ∧
gUnifies(d1, d, t1) ∧ satisfies(s1, d1) ∧ hasInScope(s1, s)) (77)
According to the social construction principle, when redescribed by c.DnS, a
ground entity x gets characterized as follows:
– x is always classified at some time by at least one concept that is defined in
a description that is satisfied by a situation that is a setting for x
– x description has to be shared by a social agent that is a member of a knowl-
edge community
– the description has to be expressed by an information object
– the social agent has to depute concepts that classify entities from a situation
– the social agent that shares x’s description redescribes x’s situation by means
of involving x’s description into another description. This is equivalent to
having x’s situation in the scope of the redescription situation. 11
The social construction principle can be interpreted as a unity criterion (cf. also
[40] for a non-reified account of unity criteria), which becomes available to x. In
other words, its redescription allows x to be unified (80). The unification relation
holding for collections (62) can be used for any ground entity, and we generalize a
temporal version of it for all ground entities (gUnifies, or generalized unification,
78).
gUnifies(d, g, t) =df D(d) ∧G(g) ∧ T (t) ∧
∃(c)(C(c) ∧ defines(d, c) ∧ classifies(c, g, t) (78)
The intuition of generalized unification is that we can imply a “singleton” collec-
tion that is covered by the concept c (axiom 79), and whose unique member is the
ground entity g. Since membership is temporalized, we need a temporal index in
78.
gUnifies(d, g, t)→ ∃(k, c)(K(k) ∧memberOf(g, k, t) ∧
unifies(d, k) ∧ defines(d, c) ∧ covers(c, k) ∧
¬∃(e)(g 6= e ∧memberOf(e, k, t)) (79)
Another simpler way to explain the notion of ground entity is therefore based on
gUnifies (axiom 80).
G(x)↔ ∃(d, t)(gUnifies(d, x, t)) (80)
11 Note that there is no room for infinite regression, because the construction principle does not
apply to ground entities that are also SE, therefore the redescription situation is not itself in
the scope of a further redescription situation, unless requested by the case.
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3.4 Projections of c.DnS: the grounded construction principle
So far, we have only concentrated on the core DnS relation, which focuses of
schematic entities and how they can be used to provide ground entities with a
unity criterion. On the other hand, we have also anticipated that a more prac-
tical version of DnS can include a mild commitment to certain types of (non-
schematic) entities. In the following, we introduce new relations that will eventu-
ally allow the specification of a grounded construction principle.
The following is the signature of the additional projections for a grounded c.DnS:
〈actsFor, constructs, individuallyConstructedAs, realizes〉
The agentEfficacy principle In 3.3 we have assumed that social agents can
depute (41) concepts (e.g. roles) that are supposed to classify the entities that can
act for the agent. For example, a telecom company can depute the role engineer
that can classify certain entities (typically, natural persons with appropriate cur-
ricula) to act for the company.
The actsFor (81) relation holds for entities and social agents. It formalizes the
intuition of acting for a social agent, i.e. the mapping of entities as actors that are
classified by concepts that are deputed by a social agent.
actsFor(e, a, t) =df E(e) ∧A(a) ∧ T (t) ∧ ∃c(classifies(c, e, t) ∧
deputes(a, c, t)) (81)
An example is provided in 42.
actsFor(Napolitano, ItalianState, 2007) (82)
If we assume that an actsFor relation is required for social agents, i.e. social
agents should always be acted by some entity, that assumption can be called the
agentEfficacy principle (83).
A(x)→ ∃(e, t)(E(e) ∧ actsFor(e, x, t)) (83)
Typically, social agents are acted by physical organisms, but actors can also be
natural and legal persons, animals, robots, or even viruses. However, agent effi-
cacy could be supported with a stronger claim, i.e. the rationalAgentEfficacy
principle, stating that social agents must be acted by entities that can have internal
meta-representations, hence only by (a subclass of) cognitive systems.
The cognitiveCounterpart principle We introduce a class for entities that
can ground the action of social agents, and call them physical agents, or PA (84).
PA(pa)→ E(pa) ∧ ¬SE(pa) (84)
Similarly, we ground descriptions in entities that can be localized into individual
physical agents, and call them internal representations (85).
R(r)→ E(r) ∧ ¬SE(r) (85)
The constructs relation holds for physical agents (or cognitive systems) and
internal representations. Physical agents are considered non-schematic entities,
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so we have to identify them in the domain of existing ontologies, and possibly
add them to an ontology when missing (similarly to time intervals).
constructs(pa, r, t)→ PA(pa) ∧R(r) ∧ T (t) (86)
Statement 87 exemplifies grounded construction.
constructs(NapolitanoAsOrganism,
N.′sRepresentationOfItalianConstitution, 2007) (87)
The individuallyConstructedAs relation is the projection of c.DnS over de-
scriptions and internal representations. It formalizes the correlate of descriptions
as internal representations in a physical agent (intended as a cognitive system)
that actsFor a social agent that shares the description. A cognitiveCounterpart
principle states that for any description there is a social agent that shares it, and
which is acted by a physical agent that constructs an internal representation that
is the individual construction of that description.
individuallyConstructedAs(d, r, t)→ ∃(pa)(PA(pa) ∧
shares(a, d, t) ∧ constructs(pa, r, t) ∧ actsFor(pa, a, t)) (88)
Statement 89 exemplifies individual grounded construction.
individuallyConstructedAs(ItalianConstitution,
N.′sRepresentationOfItalianConstitution, 2007) (89)
The agentEfficacy and the cognitiveCounterpart principles can be composed, in
order to create a dependency of schematic entities on non-schematic ones, i.e.
assuming that sharing descriptions requires constructing internal representations.
shares(a, d, t)→ ∃(pa, r)(PA(pa) ∧ constructs(pa, r, t)
∧actsFor(pa, a, t)) (90)
The informationGrounding and groundedConstruction principles An
important projection concerning the way descriptions are substantially shaped
and communicated is the realizes relation (93), holding between information ob-
jects and (physical) ground entities, which we call physical realizations, or PR
(91).
PR(pr)→ E(pr) ∧ ¬SE(pr) (91)
realizes(pr, i, t)→ PR(pr) ∧ I(i) ∧ T (t) (92)
For example, the original paper document of the Italian Constitution realizes the
Italian Constitution text in 1946 (93)
realizes(OriginalPaperDocumentOfItalianConstitution,
ItalianConstitutionText, 1946) (93)
This is related to information grounding, which is an obvious precondition for
communication to happen: any information object must have a physical ‘support’.
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Similarly to time intervals and physical agents, physical realizations of informa-
tion must be present in the ground domain, or need to be added to it.
The agentEfficacy and the cognitiveCounterpart principles can be composed with
the informationGrounding principle, in order to create a dependency of descrip-
tion sharing (and their internal construction) on realizing information objects that,
as physical realizations, express the descriptions (94).
shares(a, d, t)→ ∃(pa, r, i, pr)(PA(pa) ∧ constructs(pa, r, t) ∧
actsFor(pa, a, t) ∧ expresses(i, d) ∧ realizes(pr, i)) (94)
Axiom 94 enables a stronger interpretation of the redescription relation (8), since
it now requires a social agent to be grounded in a physical agent, a description
to be grounded in an internal representation constructed by the physical agent,
and an information object to be grounded in a physical realization that realizes it.
Stronger redescription results into grounded scoping (96), and the grounded con-
struction principle (97). Grounded scoping allows us to distinguish two different
times for a situation s: the time of its setting, and the time of its redescription.
Only the first is the ‘real’ time of s, while the second one is actually the time of
the redescription situation s′ 6= s, so that hasGroundedScope(s′, s).
Notice that not all applications of c.DnS need the specification of a redescription
situation. Such a situation is postulated by the theory, but its explicit naming and
specification are useful only when the epistemological decision concerning in-
terpretation is of some concern. E.g., when assessing witnesses in a legal case,
or when selecting between judgments that may have different authoritativeness,
trust, or contextual bindings.
hasGroundedScope(s1, s2) =df hasInScope(s1, s2) ∧
∃(a, t, pa, r)(A(a) ∧ T (t) ∧ PA(pa) ∧R(r) ∧
redescribes(a, s2, t) ∧ actsFor(pa, a) ∧ constructs(pa, r)) (95)
An example of grounded scoping is 96.
hasGroundedScope(SherlockHInterpretation,
HoundOfBaskervilleFact) (96)
Finally, we present the enriched construction principle with grounding in the ax-
iom 97.
G(x)↔
∃(d, s, c, a, r, i, kc, t, c1, pa, pr, d1, s1, t1)(D(d) ∧ S(s) ∧ C(c) ∧
A(a) ∧R(r) ∧ I(i) ∧KC(kc) ∧ T (t) ∧ C(c1) ∧ PA(pa) ∧
PR(pr) ∧D(d1) ∧ S(s1) ∧ T (t1) ∧ classifies(c, x, t) ∧
settingFor(s, x) ∧ defines(d, c) ∧ satisfies(s, d) ∧
shares(a, d, t) ∧ unifies(d, kc) ∧memberOf(a, kc, t) ∧
constructs(pa, r, t) ∧ actsFor(pa, a, t) ∧ deputes(a, c1, t) ∧
classifies(c1, pa, t) ∧ expresses(i, d, t) ∧ realizes(pr, i, t) ∧
settingFor(s, t) ∧ settingFor(s, pa) ∧ redescribes(a, s, t1) ∧
settingFor(s1, pa) ∧ settingFor(s1, pr) ∧ settingFor(s1, r) ∧
shares(a, d1, t1) ∧ gUnifies(d1, d, t1) ∧ satisfies(s1, d1) ∧
hasInScope(s1, s)) (97)
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According to the construction principle, when redescribed by c.DnS, a ground
entity x gets now an additional characterization:
– the description of x has to be shared by a social agent that is acted by at least
one physical agent capable of constructing an internal representation
– the description has to be expressed by an information object that is realized
by a physical realization
– the social agent has to depute a concept that classifies the physical agent
acting for it.
3.5 Plans
Before discussing our typology of collectives, we introduce here some axioms for
plans [26], which have the following properties (103):
– A plan is a description that represents an action schema
– Coherently with c.DnS, we assume that a plan is shared by a social agent,
provided that it is constructed by a physical agent (90).
– A plan defines or uses at least one task (101) and one role (100), which
are two kinds of concepts.
– A plan has at least one goal (108 below) as a proper part (properPart is
assumed with its usual mereological semantics).
Tasks are concepts that classify action-like entities, which we assume here as Ac-
tions (98) without a specific characterization, while roles are concepts that clas-
sify object-like entities, which are also assumed generically as Objects (99)12.
Finally, roles can have tasks as targets (102).
Action(e)→ E(e) (98)
Object(e)→ E(e) (99)
Role(c) =df C(c) ∧ ∀(e, t)(classifies(c, e, t)→ Object(e)) (100)
Task(c) =df C(c) ∧ ∀(e, t)(classifies(c, e, t)→ Action(e)) ∧
∃(r)(Role(r) ∧ targets(r, c)) (101)
targets(x, y)→ Role(x) ∧ Task(y) (102)
In [26], roles are explicitly defined as concepts that classify DOLCE objects,
while tasks are defined as concepts that classify DOLCE actions, but here we
do not make any commitment on how action-like or object-like entities should
12 The choice of introducing actions and objects as pure primitives follows our practice of avoid-
ing overcommitment, i.e. the attempt to provide axiomatic constraints without a specific need
coming from a domain or problem to be represented or solved. We have followed the same
practice in general c.DnS when introducing time intervals, physical agents and physical real-
izations with no characterization, except being entities
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be represented in a (legacy) ontology. Based on previous axioms, a Plan class is
characterized in 103.
Plan(d)→ Description(d) ∧ ∃(a, t, c1, c2, g)(shares(a, d, t) ∧
A(y) ∧ T (t) ∧ Task(c1) ∧ uses(d, c1) ∧Role(c2) ∧
uses(d, c2) ∧Goal(g) ∧ properPartOf(g, d, t)) (103)
Examples of plans include: a way to prepare an espresso in the next five minutes,
a company’s business plan, a military air campaign, a car maintenance routine,
a plan to start a relationship, etc.
Plans can have a rich internal structure, because they can have subplans, main and
intermediate goals, roles that target more than one task, tasks that are targeted
by more than one role, hierarchical tasks and roles, parameters on attributes of
entities classified by tasks or roles, etc. A rich axiomatization of plan structures
and task types is provided in [26]; here we only concentrate on goals.
Parts of plans A plan can have several proper parts (regulations, goals, norms),
including other plans. For example, social agents are introduced by constitutive
descriptions (104); if a plan introduces (21) a social agent, the related constitutive
description is a proper part of the plan (105):
ConstitutiveDescription(x) =df D(x) ∧ ∃(a)(introduces(x, a)) (104)
Plan(x)→ introduces(x, a)↔
∃(y)(ConstitutiveDescription(y) ∧ defines(y, a) ∧
properPartOf(y, x, t)) (105)
For example, some plans introduce temporary agents, such as teams or task forces,
whose lifecycle starts and ends within the plan lifecycle.
Plans can have subplans (106).
subP lan(x, y, t)→ properPartOf(y, x, t) ∧ Plan(x) ∧
Plan(y) ∧ T (t) (106)
Goals are necessary proper parts of plans, and are considered here as desires
(another kind of description) that are proper parts of a plan.
Desire(x)→ Description(x) (107)
For example, a desire to start a relationship can become a goal to start a rela-
tionship if someone assumes a plan in order to take action - or to let someone
else take action on her behalf - with the purpose of starting that relationship. We
propose a restrictive notion of goal that relies upon its desirability by some agent,
which does not necessarily play a role in the execution of the plan the goal is part
of. For example, an agent can have an attitude towards some task defined in a
plan, e.g. duty towards, which is different from desiring it (desire towards). We
might say that a goal is usually desired by the creator or beneficiary of a plan.
The minimal constraint for a goal is anyway to be a proper part of a plan:
Goal(x) =df Desire(x) ∧ ∃(p, t)(Plan(p) ∧
properPartOf(x, p, t)) (108)
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Goal dependencies A main goal (109) is defined as a goal that is part of a
plan but not of one of its subplans (i.e. it is a goal, but not a subgoal in that plan):
mainGoal(p1, x, t) =df properPartOf(x, p1, t) ∧
Plan(p1) ∧Goal(x) ∧ T (t) ∧
¬∃(p2)(Plan(p2) ∧ properPartOf(p2, p1, t)
∧properPartOf(x, p2, t)) (109)
subGoal(p1, x, t) =df properPartOf(x, p1, t) ∧
Plan(p1) ∧Goal(x) ∧ T (t) ∧
∃(p2)(Plan(p2) ∧ properPartOf(p2, p1, t)
∧properPartOf(x, p2, t)) (110)
It is not necessarily for a subgoal of a plan to be a part of the main goal of that
plan. E.g. consider the main goal: being satiated; eating food can be a subgoal,
but it is not a part of being satiated. Nonetheless, we can also conceive of an
influence relation between a subgoal and the main goal of the plan the first goal
is a subgoal of (111).
influenceOn(x, y) =df Goal(x) ∧Goal(y) ∧ ∃(z, t)
(Plan(z) ∧ subGoal(z, x, t) ∧mainGoal(z, y, t)) (111)
InfluenceOn can be used to talk of expected causal dependencies between
goals, either within a same or different plans.
By using the previous definitions, we can also define a disposition relation (112)
between the roles used in a plan having a main goal, and the influenced goal.
dispositionTo(x, y) =df (Role(x) ∧Goal(y) ∧
∃(p, g, t)(Plan(p) ∧Goal(g) ∧mainGoal(p, g, t) ∧
uses(p, x) ∧ influenceOn(g, y)) (112)
For example, the role eater can have a disposition to being satiated, meaning
that a person playing the role of eater that adopts that plan can act in order to be
satiated.
In interesting cases, supergoals can be created in order to support the adoption
of a subgoal. In order to describe these cases, we need an adoption relation for
either plans (114) or goals (113).
adoptsGoal(a, g, t) =df shares(a, g, t) ∧A(a) ∧Goal(g)
∧∀(p, z)(Plan(p) ∧ Task(z) ∧ uses(p, z) ∧
properPartOf(g, p))→ adoptsP lan(a, z, t)) (113)
adoptsP lan(a, p, t)→ shares(a, p, t) ∧A(x) ∧ Plan(p) (114)
Adoption is a kind of sharing, but not a kind of assuming: assuming concerns be-
liefs, and not executions. From that viewpoint, the BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention)
paradigm is not distinctive enough: when some agent adopts a plan, that agent
might believe the (meta-fact) that execution will be appropriate if complying to
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the adopted plan.
But even in that case, adoption is different from assumption, because in the latter
case the assumed description is supposed to be directly satisfied by the believed
situation. This is not the case in adoption: an agent does not ‘believe’ an executed
situation or its resulting goal situation, but (maybe) the possibility of its execution
or outcome.
In interesting cases, given a plan and its main goal, e.g. some service to be deliv-
ered, it is a common practice to envisage the supergoals of the main goal that can
be more clearly desirable from e.g. prospective users of a service (for example, a
claim like the following generates a supergoal for the service’s goal: our service
will improve your life). These cases can be represented by interlacing adopted
goals with influences between them.
Executions Plan executions (115) are situations that proactively satisfy a plan,
meaning that plan sharing time precedes (anticipates) its execution time:
PlanExecution(s) =df S(s) ∧ ∃(p)(Plan(p) ∧ satisfies(s, p) ∧
∃(t1, t2)(successor(t1, t2) ∧ shares(a, p, t1) ∧ settingFor(s, t2)) (115)
Axiom 116 formalizes that subplan executions are parts of the whole plan execu-
tion.
∀(p1, p2, s1, s2)((Plan(p1) ∧ Plan(p2) ∧ properPartOf(p2, p1) ∧
PlanExecution(s1) ∧ PlanExecution(s2) ∧ satisfies(s1, p1) ∧
satisfies(s2, p2))→ properPartOf(s2, s1))(116)
A goal situation is a situation that satisfies a goal:
GoalSituation(x) =df S(x) ∧ ∃(y)(Goal(y) ∧ satisfies(x, y)) (117)
Contrary to the case of subplan executions, which are part of the overall plan
execution, a goal situation is not part of a plan execution:
GoalSituation(x)→ ¬∀(y, p, s, t)((Goal(y) ∧ Plan(p) ∧
PlanExecution(s) ∧ satisfies(x, y) ∧ properPartOf(y, p) ∧
satisfies(s, p))→ properPartOf(x, s, t)) (118)
In other words, it is not true in general that any situation satisfying a goal is
also part of the situation that satisfies the overall plan. This can account for the
following cases:
– Execution of plans containing abort or suspension conditions (the plan would
be satisfied even if the goal has not been achieved)
– Incidental satisfaction, as when a situation satisfies a goal without being in-
tentionally planned (but anyway desired).
3.6 Norms
Norms are treated here in their social (including legal as a special case) sense, as
some specification of a conceptualization whose objective is regulatory. On the
other hand, the very idea of a regulation is far from clearcut, and we prefer to
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delimit our area of interest to the relations between aspects of social norm usage,
agents’ plans, and agent collectives.
We follow the major distinction proposed by Searle [21] between regulative and
constitutive norms. Constitutive norms create social individuals, and can contain
very few or no regulation. Here we deal only with regulative norms.
In [35], a norm is defined as a description which a case can fall under, if the enti-
ties in that case are properly classified by the concepts (roles, tasks, parameters)
used in the norm. Differently from plans, which are executed in novel situations,
norms are satisfied in a more complex and indirect way, which we formalize in
the fallsUnder relation (129). Norm execution is limited to the cases represented
in 130, and is anyway dependent on plan execution.
Norm aspects Firstly, we must consider at least three different aspects, in
which norms relate to plans:
1. Norms as conventions out of existing practices or plans (see axiom 121). A
norm, either social or legal, usually reflects an existing good practice within a
community. Typically, social and legal systems are the main way to maintain
a stability within the members and resources of a community, population,
or country, and that stability is dynamically addressed by evolving practices
(shared plans), either in a positive form (norm creation), or in a negative one
(norm deletion or update). This aspect of norms makes them contributions
to social engineering, i.e. to the creation of social reality as reflecting either
ideology or existing practices.
For example, a legal speed limit is supposed to encode the social practice
of avoiding excessive speed on vehicles that can be dangerous for people.
Therefore, a legal speed limit provides constraints to any plan execution that
requires driving at a certain speed. A plan, on its turn, is supposed to en-
code the way a desire can be realized. Such ways can be limited by existing
norms. For example, the execution of my intention to drive fast for my plea-
sure, or to arrive somewhere in a short time, has constraints coming from a
legal speed limit.
Norms as conventionalized practices depart from plans because they are not
executed, and do not have an inherent goal. When (specially in legal do-
mains) there is a talk about the goal or objective of this aspect of a norm, we
assume that that goal is actually the goal of social regulation politics, aimed
at enforcing established practices that are negotiated appropriately to a com-
munity dynamics.
Alternatively, politics or authoritative social ruling may enforce norms that
are not established practices: in that case, the norm is imposed, and the rela-
tionships with the other aspects are affected (see section ).
2. Norms as compliance checking protocols over social behavior or legal cases
(see axiom 123). Once a norm lifecycle is established, norms can be enforced
by using them as filters for social behavior. Typically, the initiative for com-
pliance checking is limited to the interest of other parties with respect to the
behavior of one party.
Norms as case descriptors depart from plans because they are not executed,
and do not have an inherent goal. On the contrary, the goal involved in this
aspect of norms is the goal of an interpretation plan that is aimed at finding a
social (or specifically legal) framework to a case or behavior. Typical exam-
ples of this aspect of norms include e.g. investigations about the (social or
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legal) responsibility for a certain event that caused damage to someone else.
When checking the compliance of visible behavior, in many cases it is nec-
essary to attribute plans to agents’ behavior. For this reason, also the plans
that can be assumed as being executed in those cases are also involved in
this aspect of norms. Moreover, sometimes we must attribute norms as parts
of agents’ plans, and therefore to assess if and how agents’ plans differ from
the norm they were expected to follow within those plans.
3. Norms as behavioral rules (constraints) within plans (see axiom 124). Once
a norm lifecycle is established, and appropriate enforcing and compliance
checking practices emerge, they can be used by social agents as constraints
within their own plans. In this sense, norms are akin to behavioral principles.
If taken as principles for social behaviour, norms can be executed, similarly
to plans, and in fact they are executed as subplans.
Norms as constraints within plans depart from plans only because their goal
is dependent on the main goal of an agent that shares the plan they are part
of. Typical examples of this aspect of norms include e.g. the assumption of
agent’s knowledgeability of a norm within a certain community.
These aspects of norms evidence the mutual dependency between plans and norms.
Plans are constrained by norms, norms encode conventional plans, and are sup-
posed to constrain agents’ plans.
Basic axiomatization of norms Aspects of norms are axiomatized here as
additional axioms to the class of norms, because their complementarity makes
them parts of a unique ontology design pattern for normative descriptions. A
norm is assumed as a description, similarly to plans (119).
Norm(x)→ D(x) (119)
Norms are disjoint from plans (120), following the rationale we have given in the
previous section.
Norm(x)→ ¬Plan(x) (120)
The three aspects of norms are axiomatized as follows: conventionalized prac-
tices (121, 122), case descriptors (123), constraints within plans (124). From the
viewpoint of a conventionalized practice, a norm uses concepts that are defined by
a (usually precedent) social practice (121). In addition, norms are parts of plans
that address a community, and use the norms to maintain some kind of social
equilibrium (122).
Norm(x)→ ∃(p)(Plan(p) ∧ ∀(c)((C(c) ∧ uses(x, c))→
defines(p, c))
(121)
Norm(x)→ ∃(p, kc)(Plan(p) ∧KC(kc) ∧
properPartOf(x, p, t) ∧ involves(p, kc, t)) (122)
From the viewpoint of case descriptors, a norm is used by an agent to interpret an
agent’s behavior (as a plan execution), so providing a redescription for it.
Norm(x)→ ∃(pe, a1, a2, t1, t2)
(PlanExecution(pe) ∧A(a1) ∧A(a2) ∧ setting(a1, pe, t1) ∧
shares(a2, x, t2) ∧ redescribes(a2, pe, t2) ∧ involves(x, pe, t2)) (123)
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From the viewpoint of plan constraints, a norm is a proper part of agents’ plans.
Norm(x)→ ∃(p, a, t)(Plan(p) ∧A(a) ∧ shares(a, p, t) ∧
properPartOf(x, p, t)) (124)
Norm application and falling under Having clarified the multiple aspects
of social norms, nowwe can distinguish norm satisfaction, called appliedIn (126),
obtained by a class of situations called norm applications (125), from what we
call falling under (129). A social situation (case, behavior, etc.) falls under a
norm when an agent applies that norm in order to redescribe the situation, either
in positive (compliance) or negative (non-compliance) terms.
Formally, a plan execution can: a) be outside the scope of a norm application
(127); b) fall under a norm (129); c) execute a norm (130). In the first case, the
plan is not constrained by the norm. In the second case, the plan execution is a
case for the norm. In the third case, the plan explicitly includes the norm as a
proper part.
The fallsUnder relation holds between plan executions and norms, and is defined
by composing the hasInScope relation, and other relations, including appliedIn.
NormApplication(x) =df Situation(x) ∧ ∃(y)(Norm(y) ∧
satisfies(x, y)) (125)
appliedIn(x, y) =df Norm(x) ∧NormApplication(y) ∧
satisfies(y, x) (126)
outsideTheScopeOf(x, y) =df ¬hasInScope(y, x) (127)
outsideTheScopeOfNorm(x, y) =df
outsideTheScopeOf(x, y) ∧
PlanExecution(x) ∧NormApplication(y) (128)
fallsUnder(x, y) =df PlanExecution(x) ∧Norm(y) ∧ ∃(z)
(hasInScope(z, x) ∧ satisfies(z, y)) (129)
executesNorm(x, y) =df PlanExecution(x) ∧Norm(y) ∧
∃(p, pe, t)(Plan(p) ∧ properPartOf(y, p, t) ∧ executes(pe, p) ∧
properPartOf(x, pe, t)) (130)
Since norm aspects are complementary and interrelated, also norm axioms and
relations are entrenched in interesting ways. For example, norm applications may
include different situations, e.g. applying a legal norm to a case requiring an up-
to-date interpretation based on current social practices; applying a social norm to
overstate the inappropriate behavior of an agent; applying a norm as a principle
in regulating an agent’s friendship relations, etc.
These different examples of norm application can be made complementary in
some cases; e.g. applying an ethical principle with friends may be adopted or not
depending on the source of the norm, and if that source is a conventionalized
practice in a community whose members share similar descriptions of the social
world, that adoption can be easier for, or considered advisable by, a larger number
of agents.
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3.7 Collectives
We have introduced, so far, two notions of agent collection. The first is a simple
collection of agents (either social or physical), which are unified by some ratio-
nale that is extrinsic with respect to the knowledge shared by the agents, e.g. the
collection of all agents that use to drink beer, or have green eyes, or the collection
of all mosquitoes. The second notion, more relevant for this work, is knowledge
community (KC, cf. 68), which is a collection of social agents that is unified
by descriptions that are shared by the members, e.g., the community of semantic
web researchers.
We have also suggested that knowledge communities can be based on paradigms
(76) whose descriptions are assumed, not only shared, specially in scientific com-
munities and communities of practice. The notion of community of practice leads
us to a more complex notion of collective, which is based on sharing (or assum-
ing) ways of doing things, i.e. plans and workflows.
Therefore, in this section we augment the notion of knowledge community with
more types, based on more specific descriptions that agents can share: plans and
norms. We call intentional collectives (see definition 131) those knowledge com-
munities that are unified by a plan; while we call intentional normative collectives
(see definition 134) those knowledge communities which are unified by plans
that, in turn, are entrenched with norms, according to the aspects described and
formalized in section 3.6. Finally, we introduce knowledge collectives (see defi-
nition 138) as those intentional normative collectives that also share an epistemic
workflow (see axiom 137), in order to exchange or modify knowledge.
Social and physical agents in collectives In knowledge communities, cov-
ering and characterizing concepts classify social agents. How to talk of knowl-
edge communities and collectives whose members are physical agents? From a
constructivist’s viewpoint, this move is not necessary; in fact, since social agents
need to be acted by physical agents (or cognitive systems), every non-empty
knowledge community will be eventually enacted by physical agents. From the
grounded construction principle (97), we can infer that, whenever we talk of a
knowledge community, the possibility is created of having physical agents that
construct internal representations of descriptions shared by social agents. There-
fore, in the following we do not make any attempt to distinguish knowledge
communities whose members are social from those whose members are phys-
ical, since the dual nature of the construction principle (both in the social and
grounded version) guarantees expressive means as well as correct inferences.
Intentional collectives As proposed in [3], collective action can only originate
from the adoption of a common action schema, i.e. from the unification of a col-
lective by means of a plan. Intentional collectives are defined in a straightforward
way in (131) as knowledge communities unified by plans.
IntentionalCollective(x) =df KC(x) ∧ ∃(p)(Plan(p) ∧
unifies(p, x)) (131)
Organizations, teams, task forces, governments, committees, etc. can be modeled
as social agents that are acted by intentional collectives unified by shared plans.
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For example, we can generalize over organizations as in axiom 132.
Organization(x)→ A(x) ∧ ∀(y, t)(actsFor(y, x, t)→
∃(k)(memberOf(y, k, t) ∧ IntentionalCollective(k))) (132)
On the other hand, organizations and most free associations are also based on
rules. In the next section, we show how this aspect of complex social agents can
be modeled.
Intentional normative collectives Plans can be framed in a wider descriptive
context, including regulations, normative constraints, social relationship types,
etc. In that case, collective action results to emerge from the ‘bundle’ of descrip-
tions that unifies the collective. Our notion of Bundle, introduced in 3.3, helps us
in creating another type of knowledge communities, which are defined as unified
by a bundle including entrenched plans and norms.
Firstly, we introduce the notion of NormPlanBundle.
NormPlanBundle(b) =df Bundle(b) ∧ ∃(p, n, t)(Plan(p) ∧
Norm(n) ∧ properPartOf(p, b, t) ∧ properPartOf(n, b, t) ∧
(involves(n, p, t) ∨ involves(p, n, t) ∨ properPartOf(n, p, t))) (133)
Definition 133 refers to entrenchment of norms and plans as three possible cases:
– A norm involves a plan, i.e. when a norm, which is supposed to rule the
behavior of a community, considers some typical plans of the agents specifi-
cally. E.g. a speed limit regulation that promotes specific counteractions for
the drivers that attempt to escape the enforcement of the norm
– A plan involves a norm, e.g. a driving plan is built in order to avoid the
consequences of not complying to a speed limit (as when decreasing speed
when seeing a police vehicle)
– A norm is a part of a plan, e.g. a speed limit is straightforwardly considered
as a parameter in a driving plan shared by an agent
Now, an intentional normative collective (134) is a knowledge community unified
by a NormPlanBundle (133):
IntentionalNormativeCollective(x) =df KC(x) ∧
∃(y)(NormPlanBundle(y) ∧ unifies(d, x)) (134)
Whereas a NormPlanBundle is explicitly stated (‘anticipated’), like in a closed
set of tasks that describe, for instance, the possible actions for a social agent,
there exists a unique, communicable motivation (the plan defining the tasks) for
the collective action.
On the contrary, whereas a bundle is not anticipated, collective action is an epiphe-
nomenon, or something that dynamically appears out of local conditions. Here we
do not attempt a formalization of epiphenomenic bundles, leaving it to further re-
search.
Knowledge collectives Having introduced norms into the identity criteria for
complex agents and their collective action, we are still left with the problem
of defining the knowledge-level structure of those agents, and how the collec-
tives that act for them can be characterized at that level. In order to do that, we
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merge the notion of Paradigm (76), with that of NormPlanBundle. Epistemic in-
fluences (definition 137) are NormPlanBundles that govern the influence between
the agents from a community, with respect to their core knowledge, i.e. the col-
lection of their assumed descriptions, or paradigm (76)13.In order to define it, we
need some specific concept types.
A knowledge role (axiom 135) is a concept that classifies only information ob-
jects that have an epistemic relevance, i.e. they express descriptions that help
maintaining the identity of a community by being exchanged, enriched, or re-
vised according to appropriate plans and norms. E.g. the term “force” plays a
knowledge role in contemporary physics because the relations and axioms (the
descriptions) that are assumed when using that term contribute to the stability of
contemporary physics’ paradigm (the notion of paradigm has been formalized
here in 76).
KnowledgeRole(x)→ C(x) ∧
∀(i, t)(classifies(x, i, t)→ I(i) ∧ ∃(d, p)(expresses(i, d, t) ∧
Paradigm(p) ∧ properPartOf(d, p, t))) (135)
An agent role (definition 136) is a concept that can only classify social agents.
AgentRole(x) =df C(x) ∧ ∀(a, t)(classifies(x, a, t)→ A(a)) (136)
Epistemic influence (definition 137) is now formalized as a NormPlanBundle
(definition 133) that necessarily uses (axiom 19) at least one knowledge role (ax-
iom 135) and at least one agent role (axiom 136).
EpistemicInfluence(x) =df NormPlanBundle(x) ∧ ∃(y, z)
(KnowledgeRole(y) ∧AgentRole(z) ∧ uses(x, y) ∧ uses(x, z)) (137)
The notion of epistemic influence is very flexible, since it can be used to talk about
one agent that is influenced by some knowledge, as well as about two or more
agents that mutually influence each other through their individual knowledge.
Based on it, we define knowledge collectives are intentional normative collectives
whose unifying bundle is an epistemic influence that has a paradigm (76) as part.
KnowledgeCollective(x) =df
IntentionalNormativeCollective(x) ∧
∃(y, p, t)(EpistemicInfluence(y) ∧ unifies(d, x) ∧
Paradigm(p) ∧ properPartOf(p, y, t)) (138)
Epistemic influences found most agent interactions. In particular, the involvement
in a social relation (definition 139) depends on the fact that involved agents are
members of a same knowledge collective, i.e. on agreeing on a shared epistemic
influence bundle, towards which all agents are accountable. Accountability is not
treated here, but it will be axiomatized on the more basic notion of assumption
(axiom 73), which is used here for axiom 139.
SocialRelation(x) =df EpistemicInfluence(x) ∧ ∃(kc)
(KnowledgeCollective(kc) ∧ unifies(x, kc) ∧ ∀(a, t)
(memberOf(a, kc, t)→ assumes(a, x, t))) (139)
13 We remark that we are not interested here in how descriptions are grounded in physical agents,
but only in the fact that social agents share those descriptions
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Intuitively, if the agents that participate in a social relationship do not comply
to the plans and norms that they are expected to assume (according to a given
epistemic influence bundle that unifies the relationship), the underlying collective
cannot be “brought about” by them.
Brings about (axioms 140 and 141) is a specialized projection of c.DnS
maximal relation, holding for social agents and knowledge collectives at a certain
time, and requires agents to assume an epistemic influence bundle that has to be
adopted by the member agents in the collective.
bringsAbout(x, k, t)→ actsFor(x, k, t) ∧
A(x) ∧KnowledgeCollective(k) ∧ T (t) (140)
bringsAbout(x, k, t)→ ∃(y)(assumes(x, y, t) ∧
EpistemicInfluence(y) ∧ unifies(y, k) ∧
∀(a, t)(memberOf(a, k, t)→ adoptsP lan(a, y, t))) (141)
When applied to social relations in general, brings about requires participating
agents to assume it, not just to adopt it as a plan. In other words, social relations
are maintained by knowledge collectives that are brought about by their mem-
bers.14
With c.DnS, norms, plans, epistemic influence bundles, knowledge col-
lectives, and social relationships, we have got a rich ontology to describe the
nature and the behavior of complex social agents like organizations, institutions,
corporations, teams, lobbies, movements, etc.
A recap of the main classes of the schematic entities introduced here, with
their taxonomy and disjointness axioms, is depicted in Figure 1.
4 Conclusions
In this article, we have presented a formal framework to represent social agents,
collectives, plans, norms, and their dependencies. The framework is based on
the constructive version of the ontology of Descriptions and Situations (c.DnS),
which has been applied to the modelling of social reality and information objects
in several applications for the semantic web, business interaction, healthcare in-
formatics, digital libraries, etc.
c.DnS provides a complex pattern for social entities, axiomatized as the so-
called construction principle, and can be extended to represent a grounded ver-
sion of the principle. Plans and norms are represented here as extensions of c.DnS,
and a typology of collectives is defined on top of these extensions.
Social agents are taken as primitives, independently from their embodiments as
cognitive systems, organisms, robots, etc. Embodiments can be represented in
14 The notion of social relation proposed here may be perceived as having a ‘scientific’ flavor,
because we are proposing that agents in a social relationship assume a common paradigm,
i.e. a bundle of plans and norms. But this common paradigm should be taken as minimal
as possible, and subject to continuous revision, on the basis of the dynamics that operate on
the agents. Therefore, no special claim on the stability or scientific foundedness of a social
relationship is made here.
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Fig. 1: The main classes of schematic entities, with their taxonomy (sub-class of,
bold arrows) and disjointness axioms (red light arrows)
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Fig. 2: The contextual bindings for the representation
of a conceptualization
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the grounded version of c.DnS. This move avoids the typical multi-hierarchies
generated by classes that can be agentive or non-agentive, depending on local
commitments.
Information and knowledge play a major role in c.DnS, and have constructive
counterparts, i.e. so-called information objects, e.g. texts, images, etc., and de-
scriptions, i.e. reified relations between entities. Constructivism (knowledge is
inherent in thought collectives that create knowledge paradigms) is represented
by positing collectives of agents that share descriptions expressed by information
objects. These descriptions use concepts to classify entities within situations. All
these notions: collective, agent, description, information object, concept, situa-
tion, are first-class citizens in our ontology.
In other words, c.DnS allows to represent the contextual binding of conceptual-
izations on the circumstantial level (via situations), on the cognitive level (via
descriptions and concepts), on the social level (via collectives and agents), and
on the informational level (via information objects) (see Figure 2).
Plans and norms have been introduced on top of c.DnS, as description types.
Plans and norms are shown to be disjoint classes, but entrenched within ‘bundles’
of descriptions that provide formal unification criteria for intentional normative
collectives.
Finally, we have used our formal apparatus in order to model the interdepen-
dencies of social agents, collectives, plans, and norms against the background of
c.DnS. The main outcome can be considered a novel ability to talk -in a first-
order theory- about complex agents like organizations and institutions, together
with their knowledge-level structure (knowledge collectives, unifying plans and
norms, paradigms), as well as arriving at a more sophisticated formal notion of
social relationships as immersed into (and therefore dependent on) knowledge
collectives.
Future plans include a finer-grained classification of collectives, based on more
common sense distinctions, like:
– the type of their members (e.g. physical persons, boys, cows, left-handers);
– their knowledge domains (e.g. genetic, taxonomic, epidemiological);
– their related social practices (e.g. neighborhood, geographic, ethnic, linguis-
tic, commercial, industrial, scientific, political, religious, institutional, ad-
ministrative, professional, sportive, interest-based, stylistic, devotional);
– the ways members of collectives explicitly interact with the description bun-
dles that are expected to unify their collectives (e.g. complete or partial adop-
tion, external control and distribution of accountability, emergence, negotia-
tion, trustfulness);
– the causal relations the characterize them, according to the set-up of theDnS-
based treament of causal relations presented in [41].
Another item for our research agenda is investigating the assumptions inherent
in relevant theories of action, collective intentionality, plural reference, etc., and
describing them according to the ontology introduced here.
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